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Abstract 
 
Using insights from the sociology of knowledge and findings from preliminary empirical probes 
into IMF research since the Great Recession, this paper aims to propose a new analytical 
framework for the study of the teaching activities of the IMF’s teaching infrastructure: the 
Institute in Washington DC and in two regional centers: the Brazil-based Joint Regional 
Training Center for Latin America (BTC) and the Joint Vienna Institute (JVI). How have these 
institutes negotiated the “productive incoherence” that marks the Fund’s new stances on fiscal 
and financial economics? How have the students in these institutes internalized the conflicts 
between the research of IMF staff on these policy areas and the Fund’s official positions in a time 
of uncertainty and aperture? If indeed IMF teaching is reflexive, has the BTC teaching 
incorporated more dissenting views than the IMF Institute or the JVI, given the more systematic 
embrace of heterodox ideas by the policy mainstream of Brazil, BTC’s co-sponsor? To address 
these questions this working paper suggests a few recalibrations of the existing literature on the 
diffusion of economic ideas via IFIs. To this end, it extracts several new analytical propositions 
from the sociology of knowledge. 
 
The IMF Institutes as Teachers of Economic Ideas 
 
Political economists have shown considerable interest in the transnational diffusion of social and 
economic policies.1 For students of diffusion who take a constructivist perspective, the spread of 
the economic ideas that underlie those policies should be seen as a part of this process. This is 
because the adoption of policies is not a functional material response to pre-interpretive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This position is built on three problematic assumptions: public authority is really (and uniformly) in charge of 
processes of diffusion; economic policies always diffuse as unprocessed “scripts”; and, at the end of the diffusion 
process one can only meet unreflexive domestic “receivers” with pre-aligned conceptions of self-interest. For an 
extensive critique see Kogut and MacPherson (2008), Hobson and Seabrooke (2007), Ban (2011).  
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structural factors like exogenous crises or international competition.2 Instead, it is the result of 
transnational ideational struggles over the meaning of those structural factors.3  
 
In this struggle taking place in the transnational epistemic space, new economic ideas are 
deployed against the old by international organizations with an economic agenda (Finnemore 
and Barnett 2004; Abdelal 2005; 2006; 2007; Seabrooke 2007; Broome and Seabrooe 2007; 
Chwieroth 2007; 2009; Ban 2011), think-tank networks (Stone 1999; 2001; Stone and Denham 
2004; Stone and Maxwell 2005), nodes of the economics profession (Fourcade 2006; 2009), 
transnational political party networks (Ban 2011) or hybrid agents such as the Joint Vienna 
Institute (Broome 2010; Seabrooke and Broome) or the Global Development Network (Stone 
2001).  
 
Scholars have stressed the importance of the IMF as teacher of economic ideas via IMF teaching 
institutes set up to train domestic economic policy bureaucrats from developing countries 
(Finnemore and Barnett 2004; Broome 2011; for a review see Ban 2011; 2013). Drawing on the 
work on the transnationalization of economics done by Fourcade (2006; 2009) and Dezalay and 
Garth (2002), this paper sees the IMF’s teaching institutes as oligopolistic providers of epistemic 
capital to pivotal developing country technocrats. Given the high social prestige of they hold in 
international scientific power hierarchies and especially among policy practitioners, the IMF 
institutes provide central bank and ministry of finance officials with subsidized and time-efficient 
acquisition of scientific firepower power and status resources within the national policy fields 
themselves. 
 
This paper aims to take those insights further by focusing on the differences between these 
institutes, the ways in which they have dealt with the epistemic fallout of the current crisis and 
the ways in which their teaching was translated by graduates returning home at a time of 
unprecedented uncertainty and aperture. To do so the paper focuses on two policy areas most 
challenged by the crisis: financial regulation and fiscal policy. The regulation of the financial 
sector and particularly of the current account has been the object of the pro-liberalization pleas 
of the IMF and has been intimately connected with the causes of the crisis and with discussions 
about what is to be done (Abdelal 2008; Gabor 2011). Similarly, the IMF’s pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy during recessions has been challenged by the adoption of fiscal activism by countries not 
tied to IMF conditionality in late 2008 and 2009 (IMF 2009). How have the IMF and its 
“teaching” infrastructure lived with the ensuing “cognitive dissonance”? 
 
Against the skepticism of some IMF observers (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh 2011; Weisbrot et al 
2009; Mueller 2011; Gabor 2010), the crisis brought to the fore a consistent degree of 
“productive incoherence” in the economic ideas espoused by the Fund (Arestis 2011; Grabel 
2010; 2011; Gabor 2012; Gallagher 2011; Moschella 2011). An erstwhile champion of financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This proposition is embraced by some parts of the mainstream on the diffusion of economic liberalism (Dobbin et 
al 2008).  As demonstrated by Blyth (2002), in situations of uncertainty, the indeterminacy of interests is severe, as 
economic structures do not determine the singular grounds on which to favor a certain choice set over another. 
Consequently, agents are unclear as to what their best strategy is. Such situations open the door to idea 
entrepreneurs who can restructure the interests of agents. Once powerful policy actors redefine their interests and 
promote policies defined in the terms of the new ideas, the resulting policy regime is stabilized. 
3 See McNamara, 1998; Blyth 2002; Marcussen, 2000; 2001, 2002; Seabrooke 2001; Schmidt 2002, 2006; 
Chwieroth 2007; 2008; Ban 2011. 
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deregulation, the IMF embraced selective capital controls (Estry et al 2010; 2011; IMF 2010; 
2011). Once a promoter of the futility of counter-cyclical fiscal policy in downturns, now the IMF 
selectively encourages such interventions in surplus countries (Blanchard et al 2009) and while 
current SBAs show a great deal of continuity with the Fund’s pro-cyclical past, they take more 
seriously the social protection of the most vulnerable (Grabel 2011). Indeed, much of the IMF’s 
“new normal” incorporates some of the critiques targeted at the Fund by economists who viewed 
this IO as enforcer of a neoliberal straitjacket on developing countries (Grabel 2011).  
 
Whether the IMF lives through an interregnum (Helleiner 2010; Grabel 2011) or whether it 
stands to follow the neoclassical mainstream in its ossified conservatism (Mirowski 2010), these 
shifts raise interesting questions about how the IMF institutes where developing country officials 
are schooled into IMF orthodoxy deal with the resulting ambiguity. In this paper I plan to 
examine the pre- and post-crisis positions of the IMF Institute in Washington DC and in two 
regional centers: the Brazil-based Joint Regional Training Center for Latin America (BTC) and 
the Joint Vienna Institute (JVI). How have these institutes negotiated the “productive 
incoherence” that marks the Fund’s new stances on fiscal and financial economics? How have 
the students in these institutes internalized the conflicts between the research of IMF staff on 
these policy areas and the Fund’s official positions at this time of uncertainty and aperture? If 
indeed IMF teaching is reflexive, has the BTC teaching incorporated more dissenting views than 
the IMF Institute or the JVI, given the more systematic embrace of heterodox ideas by the policy 
mainstream of Brazil, BTC’s co-sponsor? 
 
The paper introduces a few key concepts and assumptions and then introduces a critical 
exploration of the literature on transnational diffusion through IOs. Next, by drawing on select 
approaches developed in sociology and science and technology studies, the third section sketches 
out two potential analytical pathways out of the existing problems of constructivist political 
economy. The first pathway entails a moderate modification of the existing constructivist agenda 
in political economy via a “thicker” understanding of transnational diffusion. By contrast, the 
second pathway entails a bolder departure from the status quo. The paper marshals illustrations 
of these concepts that are relevant for the literature on the IMF in its capacity as an epistemic 
powerhouse in macroeconomics. 
 
Key concepts and assumptions  
This paper is about the transnational spread of economic ideas, a term understood to mean 
economic development programs and policy narratives that specify curses of policy action. Based 
on this definition, the paper conceives of neoliberalism, for example, as a dynamic development 
program anchored in various reassertions of the theoretical postulates of neoclassical economics 
(new neoclassical economics in the 70s and 80s, the new neoclassical synthesis since the 1990s)4 
and of the policy implications of this body of thought: liberalization (of price controls, capital 
markets, labor markets and trade barriers), withdrawal of the state from the economy 
(privatization of public firms and public services, termination of industrial policy, central bank 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The neoclassical economics that constitutes the theoretical bedrock of neoliberalism should be understood as a foil 
of the main schools of thought bred by Keynes’ General Theory: the neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis (neo-
keynesianism) and of post-Keynesianism (Gabor 2011). 
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independence) and macroeconomic austerity (tight control of the money supply, low deficits, low 
inflation, the elimination of subsidies) (Campbell 2007; Blyth 2002; Bockman 2009).5  
 
As for policy narratives, they should be understood as lessons about other policy contexts where 
the development model was tested. Their function is to structure perceptions of what is feasible, 
possible and desirable (Hay 2001: 199; Widmeier et al 2007: 755) and serve as experimental 
artifacts (“evidence”) for certain economic arguments, as part of the performative nature of 
modern economics (McKenzie et al 2007; Muniesa 2005; Muniesa et al 2006; Muniesa and 
Callon 2009). Policy narratives are important because often what is spread across national policy 
jurisdictions is not the practice of a new idea as such, but “edited” accounts of this practice, 
informed by the historical narrative (Sahlin-Andersson 1996; 2002).6  
 
The theoretical framework of this study is anchored in the constructivist and discursive 
institutionalist traditions in political economy (Blyth 2002; Seabrooke 2007; Schmidt 2008). As 
such, it departs from the assumption that agents are not socialized into an a priori efficient 
outcome (e.g. neoliberal reforms). Rather, such outcomes are contingent on how the exogenous 
shocks and interests materialists talk about are interpreted, sustained and transformed by agents’ 
interesubjective understandings (Blyth 2002; 2006; Widmeier et al 2007; Schmidt 2008). 7  
 
 
The Status Quo: The Diffusion of Economic Ideas Through IOs 
 
Political economists have long recognized the importance of domestic “sympathetic 
interlocutors” for the capacity of IFIs to obtain domestic consent (Woods 2006; Vreeland 2003; 
Bowden and Seabrooke 2006; Broome and Seabrooke 2007; Pop-Eleches 2009; Gabor 2010). 
But what makes domestic interlocutors sympathetic to the agenda of IFIs is not only their 
readiness to listen to IFI advice, but, more importantly, their intellectual resonance with the 
economic ideas employed by the IFIs, an outcome secured through incremental and contested 
socialization processes (Finnemore and Barnett 2004; Chwieroth 2009; Ban 2011; Seabrooke and 
Broome, this workshop). 
 
How does this resonance come about in the first place? The state of the art offers plenty of 
guidance. One can draw on an extensive generic IR literature on the transnational spread of 
norms (Risse-Kappen 1994; Cortell and Davies 1996; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Checkel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Neoliberals posit causal links between tax cuts and capital investment (rather than consumption) or between the 
rigidity of employment protection legislation and unemployment figures. Also, a litany of neoliberal policy templates 
(often identified with Williamson’s original Washington Consensus) can be derived from the neoliberal policy 
paradigms: reducing inflation and budget deficits (even at the cost of employment), privatization, the scrapping of 
industrial policy, lower marginal tax rates and reduced corporate income tax rates, deregulation of financial 
instruments, decentralization and flexibilization of labor protection and the use of market principles in public 
services (for an he overview of the neoliberal program see Heilbroner and Milberg, 1995). 
6 As a recent review of constructivist political economy scholarship put it, “[a] research focus on the construction of 
crises would allow analysis to better recognize the importance of expressive struggles over the “lessons of history,” as 
intensified debate over the meaning of contemporary events often fosters reinterpretations of past wars and crises.” 
(Widmeier et al 2007: 755). 
7 As a reviewer put it, “World War II did not cause the Bretton Woods Agreements. Rather, what agents thought 
caused World War II caused the Bretton Woods Agreements to take their particular form.” (Wiedemeier et al 2007: 
749). 
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1998;199;2005; Legro 1997; Risse and Sikkink 1999) or on a less extensive but focused one, on 
the spread of economic ideas through IFIs (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Epstein 2004; 2005; 
2009; Chwieroth 2009; Broome 2010). Both these strands of scholarship define diffusion as the 
process through which ideas are broadcasted from innovators to a broad spectrum of users in 
universally applicable formats and through various impersonal channels and relational patterns. 
They emphasize the importance of the replication of the economic ideas that undergo diffusion 
and zero in on the customization (or lack thereof) of norms/ideas to local conditions via the 
analysis of “congruence” or “goodness of fit” between ideational imports and domestic ideational 
legacies. 
 
More specifically, the central hypothesis of this scholarship is that norm/idea diffusion is “more 
rapid when …a systemic norm…resonates with historically-constructed domestic norms” 
(Checkel 1998: 4). In this conceptualization, local actors are limited to performing the role of 
entrepreneurial norm framers. For example, the degree of affinity of neoliberal ideas with pre-
existing economic ideas can be measured by the degree of familiarity of a substantial number of 
domestic policy stakeholders with the neoclassical economic tradition from which neoliberalism 
had emerged. According to this approach, an inadequate cultural match (a situation when 
framing is not credible) can be expected to be a robust predictor of failed diffusion. 
 
This is an elegant approach but the focus on the reproduction of the ideas to be diffused has costs 
related to the problems of the sociological literature on isomorphism in organizational fields on 
which its assumptions rest.8 According to this model, diffusion begins with research extends into 
development, which is then coded as an innovation and actively “sold” to various audiences. Or, 
this body of work has been the object of extensive critique in sociology (Jepperson 1991; Latour 
1987; 1993; Eyal and Bockman 2001) for its provision of an excessively static and linear (“thin”) 
understanding of diffusion.  
 
In contrast, more recent research in the theory of technoscientific change emphasizes a 
nonlinear, interactive and iterative view, with feedback loops affecting each stage and with the 
research stage affecting each of the stages of the process (Kline and Rosenberg 1986; Akrich et al 
2002; Seabrooke and Broome, GREEN 2012). This perspective turns diffusion into a more 
political contentious process than currently envisaged by the existing constructivist research. 
Similarly, the popular assumption that there is always an active “Northern” core of authors and 
advocates of new economic ideas and a passive “Southern” periphery of recipients shows a 
systemic selection bias in favor of the diffusion of the neoclassical synthesis and “Chicago School” 
neoclassical economics. Yet other ideational innovations (dependency theory, structuralism, 
market socialism) were either crafted de novo in peripheral settings like Latin America, Eastern 
Europe (Love 1988; 1996; Bockmann 2011; Ban 2011) and, more recently, South-East Asia (Lin 
2011). This suggests that perhaps this research agenda should take more horizontal forms of 
diffusion seriously. 
 
Finally, the critics of world polity scholarship stress its failure to take the reflexivity of external 
diffusers and local receivers seriously. The same should hold for existing constructivist work on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Guillen 2001; Meyer and Roman 1991; Meyer and Hannan 1979; Thomas et al 
1987; Meyer et al 1997; Boli and Meyer 1987; Strang and Meyer 1993: 137; Strang and Mayer 1993; Soule 1997; 
2005; Strang and Soule 1998; Drori et al 2003) 
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diffusion, with its scant attention to the highly plausible contention that when ideas travel from 
one site to another, the receiving actors may not passively “sign for delivery” and then go on and 
use the ideas handed down to them without performing any alterations. As John Campbell (2009) 
put it, the “thin” diffusionist logic popular among constructivists does not tell us  
 
[…] what happens when an institutional principle or practice arrives at an organization‘s door step and is 
prepared by that organization for adoption.  Here the story often ends and it is assumed that the principle 
or practice is simply adopted uncritically.  We are left, then, with a black box in which the mechanisms 
whereby new principles and practices are actually put into use and institutionalized on a case-by-case basis 
are left unspecified.” 
 
A study on the diffusion of human rights in Asia published in International Organization by Amitav 
Acharya (2004) used a “thick” diffusion framework to examine how Western ideas are adopted 
when domestic translators face inadequate mismatch between new Western ideas and old 
domestic ones. Acharya showed that instead of taking the ideational misfit as given, domestic 
adopters engaged in localization, a process of manufacturing ideational congruence through the 
reinterpretation and re-representation of the outside norm (Acharya 2004: 244).9 Such insights 
should travel in the literature on the diffusion of economic ideas through IFIs such as the IMF. 
Moreover, as Seabrooke and Broome have showed, neither should one assume that diffusers 
always deliver the same package of ideas. Instead, there is a lot of tailoring to local conditions 
being done, often in interaction with domestic agents, before advocacy for a given set of 
economic templates actually begins.10  
The next sections suggest that there is much to gain from a “thicker” definition of diffusion that 
could embrace the process of hybridization of ideational innovations with local ideas 
(“translation”), as well as from a completely new perspective that scraps the concept of diffusion 
altogether and replaces it with a redefined “translation.” It is to these new steps that I now turn. 
 
Making Diffusion “Thicker” 
 
Some sociologists and political scientists interested in the transnationalization of economics (Babb 
2002; Fourcade 2005; 2009; Hay 2004; Ban 2011) have showed that the domestic adoption of 
neoliberal ideas was filtered by the content of domestic ideological frames and state-society 
relations. If this is true, then ideational innovations like the scientific arguments for pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy or capital account liberalization stand to be “edited” as they travel through various 
epistemic contexts, with feedback loops affecting the overall process. Following Blyth (2002), I 
expect that the ambit of editing increases in times of systemic uncertainty, such as the 2008-2009 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Through framing idea advocates create linkages between external emergent ideas and preexisting domestic ideas 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1999: 268). By contrast, grafting is used to diffuse a new idea by associating it with a 
preexisting idea “in the same issue area which makes a similar prohibition and injunction.” (Acharya 2004: 244). 
10 This fact had been evident to sociologists at least since the foundational work of Gabriel Tarde a century ago, and 
saw a major rediscovery in sociology with Westney’s (1987) study of the diffusion of Western ideas in Japan during 
the Meiji era. Since the 1990s and the 2000s the emphasis on the dynamic nature of diffusion and the importance of 
hybridization through the active role of receivers loomed large in sociological research.See Sevon 1996; Sahlin-
Andersson 1996; Djelic 1998; Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Campbell 2004, ch. 3, Sahlin-Andersson and Engvall 
2002; Czarniawska and Sevon 2005; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Pedersen and Campbell 2006; Campbell 
2009). 
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period, when the ideational status quo in these two branches of economics taught by IMF 
institutes were challenged by the crisis. 
 
Based on these insights, I redefine idea diffusion as the interaction between the transnational 
spread of ideas (“diffusion” in the narrow sense) and their domestic adaption through “editing” 
(Sahlin-Andersson 1996)/“bricolage” (Fourcade and Savelsberg 2007). During the process of 
translation domestic actors do not simply cut-and-paste new economic ideas developed in foreign 
“labs.” Instead, they interpret and screen those ideas before adoption, leading to their 
reformulation in terms of their focus, content and meaning. Similarly, what is actually being 
diffused varies depending on who does the teaching. In their work Leonard Seabrooke, Andre 
Broome and Catherine Weaver have shown that IFIs tend to discriminate among the objects of 
their socialization and navigate a complex dissonance between official economic ideas and “ideas 
at work.” Thus redefined, editing may produce mistranslations, hybrids and affect pre-existing 
economic ideas as well.  
 
In practice, this perspective entails making these processes of interpretation an object of analysis 
in its own right through framing and grafting analysis. While framing has been extensively 
deployed by the existing constructivist work on diffusion, grafting remains understudied. 
Pioneered by Acharya (2004), grafting is understood as an editing mechanism that associates new 
economic ideas with preexisting ideas that are relevant for the same issue area of economic policy 
and makes similar prohibitions or injunctions. Crucially, this can happen even as local ideas are 
reconstructed in accordance with the new ideas. In the case of the diffusion of neoliberalism, for 
example, the expected result can be the presentation of neoliberal ideas as if they were part of the 
domestic ideational stock, thus making neoliberalism seem less problematic in the domestic 
context. But grafting can also change neoliberal ideas by giving birth to hybrids between the local 
ideational “rootstock” and the neoliberal “stem.”   
 
For example, this author’s research on economic reforms in postauthoritarian Spain (Ban 2011) 
found that when neoclassical economic ideas about the role of the state in fostering export-driven 
growth entered Spain through IMF-trained economists among others, they were hybridized with 
apparently incongruous but deep-rooted developmentalist ideas about state ownership of 
industrial champions as a means to boost the country’s export competitiveness. This productive 
incoherence made it possible that the same government that was obsessed with the war on 
inflation threw subsidies at high achievers, bankrolled incentives for industrial diversification and 
put brakes on private mergers and acquisitions that threatened its stakes in industrial 
champions.11  
In the case of the IMF institutes, such insights led to me to formulate two categories of 
hypotheses. The first refers to the institutes themselves and the second to course-takers (typically 
central bank and ministry of finance economic experts). In line with the “thick” diffusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Key neoliberal advocates tried to demonstrate the possibility of a synthesis between the ideas of the neoclassical-
Keynesian synthesis, monetarism and rational expectations, a position that enabled the survival of progressive 
taxation and the resistance to supply-side tax policy in Spanish neoliberalism. Similarly, Ordo-liberal ideas about the 
imperative of building a social market economy as a means to generate social peace and support for capitalism, 
constituted an important ideational ‘veto point’ to the wholesale diffusion of American supply-side welfare 
retrenchment narratives and the crafting of an hybrid development model in democratic Spain: supply-side socialism 
(Ban 2011). 
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literature I expect to find variation among the fiscal and financial economics taught these 
institutes. Since the IMF institute is under the most pressure to “sell” a brand of universal 
economics, I expect to find a great deal of conformity with the IMF’s party line of the day. In 
contrast, given the distance from the headquarters and the fact that the IMF’s partners at JVI 
and BTI may have some local “edits”, one may expect to find more attention to the work of IMF 
research economists whose ideas fit better with those edits, even at the cost of dissent from the 
Fund’s official policy line. To analyze this expected variation I will go beyond course syllabi 
analysis and carry out in-depth interviews with and analyze the scholarly/policy output of faculty 
who teach fiscal and financial economics. To this end, I structured the interview questionnaires 
so that the questions maximize the chance of bringing out dissident ideas. 
The call for taking diffusion agents’ reflexivity seriously entails that course-takers would not copy 
and paste the financial and fiscal policy ideas of the IMF teachers. Instead, they would edit local 
ideas into them, with the probability of this transformation increasing after they return to their 
posts in their home countries and particularly after the 2008 crisis challenged parts of the IMF’s 
economic orthodoxy. To do this, I will carry in-depth interviews with and analyze the written 
output of a dozen graduates of the IMF institutes. In order to maximize variation on the 
likelihood of un-learning of IMF fiscal and financial ideas, I will interview graduates from 
countries with governments known for some resistance to IMF recipes (Argentina, Hungary) and 
from states whose policy elites are known for their resonance with IMF ideas (Latvia, Romania). 
A survey using the codes developed in my dissertation will then be administered via Survey 
Monkey.  
The adoption of this “thicker” variant of diffusion advances the constructivist diffusion agenda by 
providing tried and tested analytical frameworks that are more respectful of the profoundly 
dynamic nature of the transnational spread of economic ideas. Yet this approach can be taken 
further by layering upon it the observable implications that the literature on translation developed 
by actor-network theory (ANT)12 can have on the study of IMF institutes. It is to this task that I 
now turn. 
Translation, not Diffusion 
 
In the sociology of knowledge actor-network theory represents a radical departure from diffusion 
studies. This is because it conceives of the flow of socio-technical knowledge (of which economic 
ideas are a part) as a process in which the identity of actors handling ideas, the relations among 
these actors and their margins of maneuver are continuously negotiated and delimited (Callon 
1997: 6). Ideas flow not through the channels of diffusion linking innovators at one end and 
adopters at the other end, but through translation, a process understood not just as local 
adaptation to changing domestic contexts, but as co-participation in innovation as well.  
 
ANT is a very complex and demanding approach marked by confusing turns and twists (e.g. 
Latour 2005) but several of its take-home points can take the constructivist research agenda into 
a more innovative, albeit less ontologically purist direction.  
 
Translation as network expansion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See Woolgar and Latour 1986; Law 1986; Latour 1987; Callon 1986; 1998; 2002; 2003; 2007; Law 1999; Callon 
and Cohendet 1999; Muniesa and Callon 2007; 2009. 
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The adoption of the ANT perspective means looking at translators not as dispassionate bearers of 
technoscientific knowledge, but as strategic political entrepreneurs motivated by the enlistment of 
other people in their networks. The research of Gil Eyal and Johanna Bockmann on the 
expansion of the neoclassical economics network from North America to the Eastern Europe 
provides an excellent illustration of how ANT can give a better resolution to empirical research 
on the transnational translation of economic ideas (Eyal and Bockmann 2002; Bockmann 2011). 
These scholars showed that the research of East European mathematical economists was 
mobilized by neoliberal economists in the West to expand their networks and attack the ideas of 
their Keynesian colleagues through a translation that blackboxed the differences between 
capitalist and state socialist economies.  
 
Network expansion appears to be at the heart of any successful translation process, with sheer 
numbers playing a consequential role in its success. How many scholars or practitioners support 
the new ideas? How many popular political and cultural narratives does it tie into? How many 
articles, books and reports issued by prestigious people or organizations can one mobilize against 
skeptics? If [translation] is successful, “only voices speaking in unison will be heard” (Callon, 
1986: 18-19). And how can unison be reached? As Latour puts it, stressing the profoundly 
strategic core of network expansion, “the rules are simple enough: weaken your enemies, 
paralyze those you cannot weaken, help your allies if attacked, ensure safe communication with 
those who supply you with indisputable instruments, oblige your enemies to fight one another” 
(Latour, 1987: 37).  
 
Crucially, this means not only the deployment of material and status incentives, or of 
technoscientific arguments that “make sense,” but also the power ‘[t]o express in one’s own 
language what others say and want, why they act in the way they do and how they associate with 
each other: it is to establish oneself as a spokesman” (Callon 1997). This means that skilled 
translators like IMF teachers can redefine the interests of domestic policy stakeholders so that 
their interests could not be pursued in the absence of the advice given by translators.  
 
To lock potential allies into the translation network, the translators must be interposed between 
these potential allies and potential opponents who may wish to define their interests in a different 
way (Latour 1987: 114). This interposition takes place by the invention of new goals (Latour 
1987: 115) and, one might end with regard to paradigmatic change research, the invention of 
new policy instruments and settings.13 For example, IMF fiscal policy ideas for Eastern Europe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Paradigmatic change occurs only when the goals of policy shift (Hall 1991). In the context of this paper, the 
change from an orthodox to a heterodox (e.g. Keynesian) policy paradigm would entail a shift from the goal of fiscal 
sustainability through deficit cuts to full employment and the closing of the difference between actual and potential 
GDP via spending increases, sharply progressive taxation and financial repression. In contrast, policy change is of a 
lesser order if only policy instruments and policy settings change. If the Fund’s growth theory is reliance on public 
investments and income transfers more than they on tax cuts, the Fund engages in a change of instruments rather 
than goals. At the level of the settings of policy, if IMF economists plead for “backloading” (gradual introduction of) 
austerity, this does not show that the Fund has gone through a Keynesian paradigm shift, only that this sequencing is 
more likely to balance growth with debt sustainability. Within this non-paradigmatic spectrum, changes are 
transformative if the new instruments and settings are derived predominantly from heterodox schools of thought and 
result in an incremental challenge to the main policy goals (the case of the Fund’s endorsement of capital controls 
under certain conditions). In contrast, they are adaptive if they are drawn from a mixed bag of orthodox and 
heterodox theories and their cumulative effect is the reproduction of the orthodox policy goal (Ban 2013). 
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during the 1990s emphasized “excess demand theory,” whose goal was the permanent reduction 
of aggregate demand, then regarded as a pathological legacy of state socialism (Gabor 2011). The 
whole theory rested on the assumption that this goal could not be reached except through IMF-
provided techniques and policy instruments. In this way, the IMF and its graduates became 
obligatory passage points in the domestic policy scene. 
 
Translators can also reshuffle the interests of potential allies by inventing new groups. Just like 
Pasteur’s introduction of the concept of the microbe as the cause of infectious disease made the 
interests of the rich and poor in cities converge around the demands made by hygienists (Latour 
1987: 115-116), the IMF’s endorsement of the establishment of independent agencies (fiscal 
councils and central banks) to monitor government’s fiscal policy choices facilitated the 
convergence between the interests of bankers and academic economists in postcommunist states. 
Another example can be found on the scholarship on IMF research. Consider case of the staff 
working papers on fiscal policy published (both working papers or articles in the peer-reviewed 
IMF Economic Review). In terms of sheer numbers, the revisionist papers dominate. While thirty-
one are revisionist, only eight are close to the orthodox position. The rise of revisionism was 
gradual. While there were only three revisionist research papers in 2008-2009, their number 
more than tripled on a yearly basis after 2011. 
How has this happened? Changes in staff ranks influenced this outcome in important ways. 
Following the appointment of Dominique Strauss Khan as managing director in 2007, the 
Research (RED) and the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) experienced dramatic personnel 
changes, from the director level down to entry-level research positions. Critically, almost all of 
them took effect after the Lehman crisis. Indeed, it was in late 2008 that Olivier Blanchard and 
Carlo Cotarelli took up their positions as directors of the RED and FAD, with Blanchard also 
acting as the Fund’s chief economist. Another senior-level revisionist (Nicolas Eizaguirre) became 
director of Western Hemisphere, a department that had been at the front of macroeconomic 
policy change in the 1980s. As my survey of IMF research on fiscal policy shows, Blanchard and 
Cotarelli co-authored a large number of revisionist papers, with their work being supported by 
research papers co-authored by deputy directors and assistant directors (Ashoka Mody, Stijn 
Claessens; Charles Collyns; Ayan Kose; Andrew Berg, Gianmaria Milesi-Feretti and Jonathan 
Ostry).  
The revisionist offensive led by the senior staff enrolled twenty-five senior and research 
economists. All but four of them took up their positions after 2008. As the figure below shows, 
both the number of authors and their position in the RED and FAD hierarchy favored the 
revisionists. Moreover, while almost all revisionist papers came from FAD and RED, most of the 
orthodox ones came from the less well-regarded research staff regional desks. This is important 
because according to an IEO report, the Fund’s current and former chief economists “noted that 
the lower quality papers tended to come from area departments, where there was less time to 
conduct research” (IEO 2011: 22). 
Figure 2: Distribution of revisionists and orthodox inside the IMF 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
The fact that about half of the revisionist papers came from FAD was critical for taking some of 
the revisionist ideas into the Fund’s policy advice. According to its formal rules about internal 
hierarchy, the Research Department is the Fund’s academic arm, while FAD is an influential 
policy department. In addition to doing research on public finance issues, the FAD actually 
provides policy and technical advice on public finance issues to the IMF member states. 
Moreover, FAD staff act in a dual capacity as researchers and as “boots on the ground.” The 
same FAD economist who today works on a research paper destined for peer review could 
tomorrow be asked to join country missions, review the fiscal content of the Fund’s fiscal policy 
advice in adjustment programs, provide technical assistance directly to governments and teach 
public finance courses in the IMF’s international training institutes.   
Moreover, FAD’s inter-departmental leverage has also benefited from a change in this 
institution’s informal norms. Shortly before the crisis, policy departments such as FAD “had 
increased their prominence [relative to area departments-author’s note] in providing “world’s best 
practice policy designs for reform programs while area desks were more concerned with assessing 
what policies can be implemented” (Seabrooke and Broome 2007). This author’s interviews 
conducted with staff members in January 2013 brought to the fore a similar perception of the 
inter-departmental balance of power inside the Fund.14 Has a similar dynamic taken place in the 
IMF’s research institutes and, if so, with what consequences? 
What if dissent persists? The answer given by ANT is clear: ‘the dissenter will now be confronted 
with boxes of reports, hearings, transcripts and studies […] Either you give up or you read 
them.” (Latour 1987: 30). As depositary of the world’s most extensive macroeconomic databases, 
through the graduates of its institutes the IMF is in a particularly powerful position to deploy 
such threats of epistemic burial against domestic policy stakeholders who remain committed to 
the rules of the game of the economics profession. Therefore, future research on the institutes 
should look for instances of such threats being made by IMF institute graduates in their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Interviews with Fund economists in European Affairs and Capital Markets departments, January 2013.  
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jurisdictional battles against domestic opponents. Of particular interest are instances when 
previously unavailable databases or output produced by prestigious economists and organizations 
should be suddenly mobilized against opponents unaware of or unable to operate these resources. 
 
Enlistment allows the translators to accumulate more relational, social, organizational or even 
financial capital, downplay the critiques deployed by challengers and increase the apparent 
strength and coherence of their projects. Successful enlistment enables the members of the 
network to blackbox certain ideas and the facts called in to legitimize them so that they can be 
rendered unproblematic and therefore sealed against opportunities for contestation. The basic 
idea behind this competitive enlistment is not only to attack and defeat opposing ideas, but also 
to create webs of relationships so strong that ideas and facts that are inconvenient become 
blackboxed and become invisible to opponents. As Gil Eyal and Johanna Bockman put it, “If a 
certain institutional form is reproduced and disseminated, this is in direct proportion to the  
amount of  resources mobilized through network ties, to the strength of the ties forged, and to the 
capacity of  interested  actors  to  close  them  in  a  "black box"; that  is,  to  hide the work 
needed  to connect together the different elements of the actor-network” (Eyal and Bockman 
2001: 314). 
 
In the budding scholarship on the IMF as teacher of economic ideas these considerations entail 
the formulation of the hypothesis that IMF teachers (at least those in Washington and Vienna) 
routinely refrain from engaging with mainstream and heterodox critiques of the IMF line on 
fiscal and financial policy. This also entails the hypothesis that in the translational dialogue 
between the IMF and domestic elites carried out in the IMF institutes, the students were not 
passive “receivers” of otherwise heavily contested “Western” wisdom. Instead, they were active 
participants in making this translation possible, while using their external linkages to fight 
jurisdictional battles against opponents in their home countries. In line with earlier 
considerations, one can expect graduates from countries with more heterodox fiscal and financial 
policies during the crisis (Argentina, Hungary) to be more actively participatory in the IMF 
networks after graduation than those from more orthodox policy regimes (Romania, Latvia).  
 
The alternative hypothesis is that IMF teachers engage with “dissident” economic ideas when 
economic crises challenge the main tenets of the mainline IMF economic theories following the 
lead of the IMF’s research community. The evidence strongly suggests that this community has 
already engaged in some limited change since the Great Recession struck. Kevin Gallagher 
(2013) and Daniela Gabor (2013) have showed that the IMF research has embraced some 
heterodox economics with regard to the introduction of capital controls.  
Similarly, Ban (2013) examined IMF research on fiscal policy and found that the expansion of 
the policy space accepted by the Fund has been real, although it has taken place in parallel with 
the further entrenchment of the market-disciplinary modes of governance associated with 
neoliberalism. Specifically, in addition to allowing the stimulus option (for some) and discrediting 
the argument that austerity leads to growth, the Fund’s research and general policy advice 
suggested that where fiscal consolidation is “inevitable,” it should be introduced only gradually 
and by recalibrating its instruments so as to strengthen state investments and improve the 
economic status of those at the very bottom of the income distribution. At the same time, rather 
than place mass unemployment as the main challenge of fiscal policy, the IMF’s has not 
displaced financial market credibility through debt sustainability as the main goal of fiscal policy. 
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By subordinating fiscal policy to the vote of financial markets, the Fund leaves the stimulus 
option open only to a dozen or so countries at any given time during the crisis. Moreover, ever 
for those cases, the Fund suggests that “entitlement reform” (cuts to social security and other 
programs) is a way of maintaining long-run credibility with the bond markets. If indeed IMF 
research matters for what it is taught in IMF institutes, the study of such recalibrations of what 
stands for IMF “wisdom” should become a key pillar of the research on the IMF’s “teaching” 
activities.  
Beyond ideas 
 
Research on the IMF institutes can also benefit from scholars’ attempts to expand the boundaries 
of what is being translated. Based on ANT-inspired research on finance, the focus of cthis 
scholarship could incorporate economic devices alongside economic theories and policy 
narratives (MacKenzie et al 2007; Muniesa et al 2007; Callon 1998; 2007; Preda 2008). Defined 
as “intellectual and material assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets” (Muniesa 
et al 2007:2), devices include quantitative macroeconomic models, pricing formulas, incentive 
grids, trading protocols and other assemblages that uphold certain economic theories and policy 
narratives and not others, while causing behavior to fit the theory’s predictions through the 
material constraints that they exercise on agents. 
 
Devices are needed not only because they are statements like any others, in the sense that that 
“are uttered, put into circulation, sent out […] convey a world” (Callon 2007: 334). Most 
importantly, without them intellectual paradigms risk remaining sequestered in the research 
cloister. To be introduced in the practice of multinational financial firms, for example, 
marginalist theory needs recording systems, pricing formulas or risk assessment algorithms that 
make its implications available to practitioners.  
 
Once created, devices function as sociopolitical technologies that constrain policy choice in 
dramatic ways by enabling only some definitions of what is deemed economically appropriate 
and by generating new realities and even new actors. Moreover, devices are particularly good at 
turning into common sense because sometimes they are well suited to conceal from practitioners 
the normative foundations on which they are based. Indeed, there seems to be no such thing as 
an a-theoretical artifact in economics. Fabian Muniesa (2003) showed that even behind the 
choice for quotation algorithms in the Paris Bourse lurked political theories about the fairness of 
financial markets. Similarly, Alex Preda (2008) showed that even something as strikingly 
mathematical as financial chartism could not be divorced from profoundly theoretical struggles 
that produced core concepts, clarified causal hypotheses and organized experiments. Once 
adopted, charts generated much of the market behaviors and political interpretations of those 
behaviors of modernity. Similarly, Donald MacKenzie showed that once it became part of the 
informational infrastructure of financial markets, the deeply normative Black and Scholes pricing 
formula remained imbricated in the practice of state and non-state actors even after it was 
proven wrong by the 1987 market collapse. 
 
To illustrate, the importance of models is underscored by the fact that the limited shift 
experienced by IMF research since the Great Recession has come not from theory but from the 
recalibration of its macroeconomic models (DGSE and SVAR). Rather than be expressed in 
theoretical terms, the editing of substantive Keynesian content into the New Neoclassical 
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Synthesis that constituted the Fund’s mainline macroeconomic theory was to a great extent 
expressed through the language of models. Particularly relevant were debates about how to 
calculate the fiscal multiplier. In October 2008 the Fund’s WEO publicly stated that the fiscal 
multiplier of expansions was negative, a restatement the New Classical argument about the self-
defeating effects of fiscal expansions. But two months later, on December 28, 2008 some of the 
Fund’s top researchers and officials declared that the output shock was so unusual, that monetary 
policy was so powerless and that deleveraging was so abrupt that fiscal multipliers were likely to 
be much higher (Spilimbergo et al 2008). In 2009 Fund research concluded that multipliers are 
higher than one in developed countries and smaller than one (yet positive) in middle-income and 
low-income countries (Spilimbergo et al 2009).  
Nevertheless, it was not until 2010 that IMF staff began to churn out studies finding positive and 
high multipliers. The implication was that fiscal policy is genuinely expansionary and that mild 
and backloaded austerity packages would have less contractionary effects than sharp and 
frontloaded ones (Leeper et al 2010; IMF 2010; Ball et al 2011; Guajardo et al 2011; Baum et al 
2012; Erceg and Linde 2012; Batini and Melina 2012; Blanchard and Leigh 2013; Muir and 
Weber 2013).  
This overwhelming backing for high multipliers was facilitated by methodological innovations in 
academia and the Fund. Within academia, the struggle between fiscal pessimists and optimists 
entailed the use of macroeconomists’ methodological workhorses: structural vector 
autoregressions (SVARs) and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DGSE).15 Interestingly, 
SVAR had been used by Olivier Blanchard in his foundational 2001 study on multipliers. 
Moreover, while studies done early in the crisis used models that did not allow multipliers to vary 
between expansion and recession and failed to capture the lack of monetary policy space when 
interest rates are close to 0, subsequent recalibrations done by academics fixed the problem 
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012). Within months, a team of IMF economists built on these 
methodological improvements and found consistently positive multipliers in recessions (Batini et 
al 2012).  
Finally, a clear manifestation of the importance of the methodological channel was that some of 
the IMF studies finding high multipliers stressed that their results was broadly consistent with the 
entire theoretical spectrum, from (old) Keynesianism to the neoclassical purism of (new) modern 
business cycle models (Leeper et al 2010; Batini et al 2012). Clearly, even the boldest revisionist 
economists at the Fund did not dare to reawaken the spirits of theoretical pluralism in 
macroeconomic research and policy. The methodological channel enabled them to mainstream 
their ideas but its use came at the cost of hindering a deeper transformation. Since such research 
travels into the syllabi of the IMF institutes, it would be of critical importance to examine how 
these recalibrations of the models refashioned the logic of what IMF teaching activities consider 
to be the new normal. 
Conclusions 
 
The sets of economic ideas that shape policy decisions or the functioning of markets are cultural 
artifacts developed through the transnational encounter between core and peripheral elites in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For a detailed explanation of these models see Auerbach (2012). 
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IMF institutes. This paper set out to contribute to the theoretical development of political science 
research on the spread of these economic ideas through international financial institutions like 
the IMF. Its core contention is that the reform of the status quo in diffusion studies entails the 
redefinition of the transnational spread of economic ideas as a more dynamic process than 
previously held. More specifically, domestic adopters should not be regarded as passive and 
unreflexive receivers of Western scripts. Instead, they should be expected to actively “edit” 
ideational imports using domestic repertoires of ideas that can alter the content of those imports. 
The result of editing would be ideational hybrids that future scholars could relate to the 
institutional varieties of capitalism mapped out by “classic” comparative political economy. 
 
Taking this endeavor in a more radical direction, the paper submits that the adoption of the 
ANT framework would push the constructivist agenda towards embracing translation as a non-
linear process of co-participation in the crafting, testing, reproduction and modification of those 
ideas. Second, the dynamics of the expansion of the initial network of translators would be at the 
center of analytical attention. By showing an agnostic stance towards the ideational or materialist 
nature of the mechanisms of network expansion, this move might be seen by some as an 
invitation to the dilution of some of the ontological commitments of constructivism whereas 
others would take it as an opportunity for creative theoretical bridging with the materialist 
mainstream in political economy. Either way, the understanding of how ideas spread across 
borders can only benefit from this opening. Finally, by opening the door to the importance of 
market devices in the definition of the sets of ideas that constitute development models, ANT 
stands the chance to give constructivism a competitive edge in the analysis of “below the radar” 
market instruments used contemporary political economy.  
 
ANT can open up a productive research agenda but it is not without its limitations. Most 
importantly, its attention to performativity may obscure the role of economic and political 
interests who resist enrollment in the translation network. As the critique put forth by Phillip 
Mirowski and Nik-Shah shows (2007), it would be thoroughly naïve to dismiss the potency of 
resistance to enrollment of established socio-economic structures, a point that ANT theorists in 
general and ANT-inspired research on IMF institutes are hard pressed to rigorously address in 
the future.  
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